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While it may not be apparent to the general public, the change
in a journal's name from "International Business Law" to "Interna-
tional Economic Law" is significant to those who deal in these
areas on a daily basis. The difference is more than simply
semantic. While both terms cover legal relationships created
when transactions cross borders, the second is much greater in
scope and provides the opportunity to deal with one of the most
important issues of contemporary international law. That issue
is the convergence of law applicable to private party transactions
with law traditionally reserved to sovereign relationships.
Members of the International Economic Law Interest Group
of the American Society of International Law have had numerous
discussions about the distinctions between "international business
transactions," "international trade law," and "international
economic law." Law professors have sought to define what
should be taught in a course with any of these titles. At the same
time, ephemeral events often have shaped definitions for us. For
the same reasons which led scholars to adopt the term "Interna-
tional Economic Law" several years ago to describe the growing
body of law affecting transborder transactions (whether private or
sovereign),' it is appropriate for a journal devoted to a broad view
to adopt this title if it aspires to catalog and influence the
development of international law applicable to economic relation-
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International economic law encompasses more than the law
applicable to private business in the international realm. It
includes rules governing relationships among private parties, as
evidenced by the important conventions developed in organiza-
tions of sovereigns such as the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"),2 the Hague Conference
on Private International Law,3 and the Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private International Law ("UNIDROIT"),4 and organiza-
tions of merchants such as the International Chamber of Com-
merce ("ICC").5 It includes rules governing relationships among
sovereigns. 6 And it includes rules governing relationships across
these two traditionally separate categories7 Thus, it represents
much of the future of international law generally.8
2 UNCITRAL's most prominent contributions include the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, English version reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987)
and in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980), and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17, para. 57 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
3 The work of the Hague Conference includes the Convention on Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial
Matter, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 and the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555.
' UNIDROIT's conventions include the Convention on International
Financial Leasing, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 931 and the Convention on
International Factoring, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 943, as well as the Restatement-
like PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994).
s Few sets of international commercial rules are as widely used as the ICC
INCOTERMS, ICC PUB. NO. 460 (1990) and the UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, ICC PUB. No. 500 (1993).
6 The most notable examples in international economic law are, of course,
the Agreements contained in the Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, including the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and those constituting "GATT 1994," all of which
were signed at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125.
7 Examples of agreements applicable to arrangements between private
parties and sovereigns are the Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985), and
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
' One need only review the table of contents of any "public" international
law casebook to determine that much of what is covered in fact deals with
economic relationships. Issues such as treatment of alien investors, sovereign
immunity (particularly the "commercial activity" exception), the U.S. act of
state doctrine, and many of the cases decided by the International Court of
Justice arise out of economic relationships and resulting disputes. See, e.g.,
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Three developmental areas indicate the convergence of what
traditionally have been discussed separately as public international
law and private international law. This convergence is ripe for
the growth and development of international economic law.
First, it has become more common for sovereign parties to engage
in commercial conduct with private parties, which makes it
increasingly likely that sovereign parties will be subject to
municipal law applied in municipal courts. The pervasive
acceptance of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has
contributed to the growing application of private law to sovereign
parties, as has the increased use of international arbitration and
dispute resolution centers devoted to private/sovereign disputes.
Second, relationships between private parties and sovereigns
increasingly have become subject to the application of public
international law.' No longer is the discussion of the treatment
of aliens in their relationships with sovereigns only the province
of public international law tribunals. Long-term economic
development agreements, private/sovereign joint ventures, and
other arrangements for public/private cooperation in the develop-
ment of resources have resulted in more and more transactions
(and more and more disputes) crossing the sovereign/private line.
Third, private parties increasingly have become affected by the
development of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agree-
ment rules generally designed to limit the conduct of sovereigns
in their relationships with other sovereigns. As more internation-
al trade rules develop, more persons and entities become subject
to those rules. The development of those rules requires careful
attention to the manner in which they are applied and the
categories of parties affected by them. While those rules and the
dispute settlement mechanisms designed for their application are
created by and may limit participation to sovereigns, they affect
the everyday conduct of private parties and private parties
increasingly will demand participation in their creation, interpreta-
tion and application.
Market economic theory and democratic process have become
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9 See generally the opinion of Professor Ren6-Jean Dupuy applying "public"
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1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. I Int'l Econ. L.
defining elements of contemporary international relations. With
their increasing acceptance has come increased involvement of the
private party in transborder transactions. The structure of
international law has yet to catch up with these developments.
International law retains notions rooted in concepts of second-tier
sovereignty that allow only the sovereign to speak for the subject,
and do not allow a relationship between the subject and interna-
tional law unless and until the sovereign permits it.1" Economic
theories dealing with free markets and political theories dealing
with democratic systems require the participation of private
parties; in fact, they are based on the fundamental assumption of
such participation." Thus, theories of sovereignty borrowed
from prior centuries can no longer accommodate economic and
political reality at the end of the twentieth century. To the extent
international law is built on those theories, it too runs the risk of
being out-of-step with the world it purports to regulate.
While we have embraced democracy and market economics as
guiding principles, we have at the same time failed to recognize
that their application requires the participation of private parties
in the international legal system - in both the development and
application of rules. Private parties with economic power have
seen fit to exercise influence over the development of international
economic law at the national, regional, and international level.
They also have sought access to the systems by which those laws
are applied to disputes." The international legal system, howev-
er, has not been consistently receptive to private party participa-
10 For a discussion of the application of traditional notions of sovereignty
to a new relationship between sovereigns and private parties in international
law, see Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685 (1995).
" For a discussion of the case for private participation in international law
under the economic theor of comparative advantage, see Ronald A. Brand,
GA Tand the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101
(1992); Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and GA TTDipute Resolution: Implica-
tions of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J.
WORLD TRADE 5 (June 1990).
12 For a discussion of the case for participation by nongovernment parties
in the World Trade Organization, see Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing
in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental
Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 "U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
331 (1996); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
359 (1996).
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tion in what traditionally has been a club of sovereigns. Nor has
the private participation which has occurred been reflective of the
broad spectrum of private interests deserving acknowledgment in
a democratic environment.
If international economic law is to succeed in improving
conditions for all peoples in an ever-shrinking world, it must
evolve to take account of the structural arrangements it purports
to regulate. Traditional separation of "public" and "private"
international law is no longer possible in the economic realm.
"International economic law" should develop in a manner
reflecting the fundamental principles of market economics and
democratic government. This may require granting authority to
multilateral and international institutions in a manner currently
considered politically unacceptable in many nations.13 Without
such evolution, however, the failure of the legal system to fit the
underlying economic and political structures can only lead to the
disintegration of the structures that do exist. There are few, if
any, areas of law more important to peaceful coexistence in the
coming years than that of international economic law. That we
still have not clearly defined the term itself only serves to
demonstrate the work ahead.
13 See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Comment, Multilateral Resolution Over
Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WITO, 17
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 266-94 (1996) (discussing current disputes over
section 301 and the new WTO dispute resolution provisions).
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